 |
|
| |
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
politically opposed both Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
Although neither Islam nor the global South have currently devel-
oped as transnational ideologies with the capacity for prolonging civil
wars, such development is not ruled out in the future. Indeed, the
United States seems to have done much recently to promote the devel-
opment of a transnational Islamic ideology. Similar to its stance during
the early Cold War, the United States appears to be re-conceptualizing
the world as bipolar, reifying the distinction between the West and the
Islamic states that may force the development of an alliance among the
states of the axis of evil. This may be hastened along by the U.S. ten-
dency to see Islam as a monolithic movement. For instance, Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich claimed in 1995 that There is a worldwide
phenomenon of Islamic totalitarianism funded and largely directed by
the state of Iran (cited in Esposito 1999:213). The lack of a mono-
lithic center for Islam is illustrated by the different states that have
been claimed as the center, including not only Iran, but also Algeria
and Iraq.
In a very real sense, the United States seems to be building its own
The Effects of the Cold War 129
enemy out of a set of formerly heterogeneous and divided states. His-
torically, the Islamic states have frequently disagreed among them-
selves on the proper form of the Islamic state and their shared political
interests. But the powerful beliefs and interpretations of the United
States, coupled with its willingness to provide intervention and mili-
tary resources, may succeed in creating unity among the formerly di-
vided Islamic states. Although perceptions are contingent rather than
necessary, the consequences of those perceptions can be quite real and
deadly, as the case of transnational Islam may prove.
6
Interstate Interventions in
Civil Wars
civil wars are often complicated by the intervention of
third-party states. Foreign governments that take an interest in civil
conflicts may bring their own forces to bear on one side or another, or
they may provide various forms of aid that significantly alter the course
of a war. Prior research on intervention has principally focused on the
intervening state its strategies, motivations, and the extent to which
those motivations are consistent with the strictures of international law
(Hoffmann 1996; Damrosch 1993; Bull 1986; Vincent 1974; Tillema
1973; Higgins 1972). Much less attention has been paid to the effects
of these interventions on the course and duration of civil wars. I discuss
the increased occurrence of intervention and its effect on weak state
civil wars and review the handful of empirical studies that have exam-
ined the effect of intervention on the duration of civil war. In general,
these studies find that interventions have increased the length of civil
wars since 1945.
One of the conundrums of intractable civil wars is: how can Third
World states, many of which have difficulty feeding and housing their
people, find the resources to wage civil wars for years or decades? The
answer is that the resources necessary to perpetuate the conflict often
come from outside the territorial borders of the state. Interstate inter-
ventions, defined broadly, have figured in most of the civil wars fought
since World War II (Luard 1972). Amazingly, as many as 71 percent of
130
Interstate Interventions in Civil Wars 131
the civil wars that have occurred since 1945 have involved support by
an external power (see Chapter 2). As one scholar notes: Virtually all
insurgencies depend to an appreciable extent on external support, most
obviously for access across the border of a neighboring state which is
prepared at least to turn a blind eye to its activities, but also for weap-
ons, money, diplomatic backing and. . . even food (Clapham 1998:15).
Intervention in the Postwar World
Interstate intervention is hardly a new phenomenon. Arguably, inter-
vention has been a part of international politics since the beginnings
of the international system (Krasner 1999). Some have even claimed
that all of international politics is only intervention in various forms
and degrees of politeness (Hoffman 1984). As the international system
has changed after World War II, however, the type and frequency of
interventions have changed correspondingly (Boli 2001). Before World
War II, most interventions were carried out by the Great Powers, ei-
ther in concert or unilaterally (Leurdijk 1986; Carre 1968; Phillips
1920). Great Power interventions were typically (though not exclu-
sively) strong and decisive, involving large military forces supporting
one side of a civil war, and resulting in rapid resolution of conflict.
If anything, nineteenth-century interventions shortened the length of
civil wars.
Interventions in the post-1945 era have become much more com-
mon than in earlier historical periods and involve countries at all levels
of military capability. Interventions are carried out by former colonial
powers, regional powers, and neighboring countries, in addition to the
superpowers. In particular, regional powers such as China, India, Indo-
nesia, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Syria, Cuba, and Vietnam have figured
prominently in the civil wars of the late twentieth century (Bull 1984).
Another difference from the past is that milder forms of intervention,
such as provision of supplies of weapons, aid, advisors, and bases, have
largely supplanted the more aggressive actions. Rather than decisively
resolving conflicts with large military forces, postwar intervention usu-
ally only provides sufficient resources to allow a conflict to continue.
Again, post-World War II interventions are often dual-sided. Almost
half of all civil wars fought since 1945 saw external support given to
both sides of the conflict (see Chapter 2 and Appendix). The effects of
132 Neverending Wars
dual-sided intervention can greatly extend the length and intensity of
a civil war by pouring resources into opposing sides, adding more and
more fuel to the fire. Often one set of states intervenes by propping
up a government perhaps one so weak that it would otherwise have
folded while other states support opposition coalitions that may also
be quite weak and in significant disarray. In extreme cases, such as the
Chadian civil war discussed below, third parties drove the conflict more
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pldoc.pisz.plpdf.pisz.plcs-sysunia.htw.pl
|
| |
|
|
|
| Podobne |
| |
|
| |
|